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THE DELAYING EFFECT OF FINANCING
CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTMENT
Mindel van de Laar and Wilko Letterie
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and Department of Organization and Strategy, BIRC, Maastricht
University, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
We develop a simple model in which a firm considers a number of
investment projects. Because of limited financial resources, the firm
can undertake at most one project. In line with the literature on
real options we stress features like irreversibility, uncertainty and
the possibility of postponing the investment decision and show
under which conditions limited availability of funds tends to
increase the value of waiting.
Keywords: financing constraints, irreversible investment, uncertainty
JEL classification numbers: D81, D92
I. INTRODUCTION
The lack of unlimited financial means influences our decision making
significantly, in all levels of society. Often firms or consumers cannot buy
everything they would like, due to the presence of financial constraints.
Limited availability of financial resources may force a consumer to decide
whether to buy a new car or to replace the kitchen instead of doing both.
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But besides choosing between buying the car or the kitchen at this moment,
the consumer also has the possibility of waiting before making an invest-
ment. It is quite possible that the existing car will break down next year and
he or she will have to buy a new car then. The presence of uncertainty will
lead to an incentive for postponement of the investment.
Examples in other fields are also numerous. In this paper we will focus
on a firm’s investment decision. In our analysis an investment is irrever-
sible. Once the firm has invested in a certain project, it will not be
possible to recover the initial expenses and use these to start an alter-
native project later, or restart the same project at better terms later.
Furthermore, the future value of the various projects is surrounded with
uncertainty and there is the option for the firm to postpone its invest-
ment decision. The real options approach predicts that the incentive to
postpone the investment increases with the amount of uncertainty sur-
rounding the future valuation of the project. Hence the higher the
uncertainty, the higher the probability the firm will suspend investing.1
We will make a distinction between a firm that does not face any
binding financial constraints and can invest in all projects that are con-
sidered profitable, and a firm that can only undertake at most one project
due to limited availability of funds and therefore has to choose how best to
spend its money. Hence, a crucial aspect of our model is that there are
competing projects engaged in a race for limited funds. This limitation
implies that only one project can be implemented ultimately. This scenario
is in line with the literature that stresses the role of capital market imper-
fections due to which some firms may face credit rationing (Hubbard,
1998). This financial obstacle to investment decisions in combination with
assumptions standard in the literature on irreversible investment under
uncertainty has received very little attention so far.2 To consider this last
case we adopt an approach that is similar to Stulz (1982) and Johnson
(1987) who derive the price of options on the maximum or minimum of
several financial assets. This paper contributes a model that provides an
alternative interpretation to this framework, including the possibility of
comparing the investment decision of firms with and without limited
financial resources. We are able to derive new comparative static results
in the case of N projects and we have a different assumption regarding the
distribution of returns to the various projects.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we briefly present the case
where a firm decides upon the timing of investing its resources in one
1These assumptions are standard in the real options approach advanced by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
2 Scarramozino (1997) deals with irreversible investment and finance constraints in the
context of incremental investment and estimates a Q-model.
3 In particular, we assume that such returns have a uniform distribution whereas Stulz
(1982) and Johnson (1987) assume returns to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion.
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project. In Section III we introduce the presence of a second project and
allow for the limited availability of financial resources. Next we discuss
the more general case of N projects in Section IV. Finally Section V
concludes.
II. ONE INVESTMENT PROJECT
In this section we present a stylized model that captures the main
elements of the recent literature on investment under uncertainty (see
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Consider a firm that has an investment
opportunity called project A. If the firm decides to invest in period 1
the net return of the investment is equal to V1A. If i indicates a project
and t denotes period t then Vti should be interpreted as the value minus
the sunk cost of investing in project i at time t.4 The net present value
rule suggests making an investment as soon as V1A > 0. However, the
recent literature on investment argues that the value of V1A should be
compared with the expected net present value the investment yields if the
firm delays its decision. Suppose that the firm also has the option to start
project A in period 2.5 If the firm invests in period 2 the net value of the
project is equal to V2A. If the firm invests in the first period, it is
impossible to recover the initial sunk cost of investment and to restart
the project in period 2. This precludes the firm from setting up the
project at better terms in period 2 and from acquiring the potentially
larger value V2A. To capture the notion that future realizations are
uncertain, we presume that V2A is a random variable which is uniformly
distributed on the interval [, þ]. Both  and  are strictly
positive. The parameter  denotes the expected value of V2A. The vari-
ance of V2A equals 
2. Therefore, a higher  implies a higher degree of
uncertainty surrounding the future benefits of the project.
We assume it is not possible to postpone the investment decision even
after period 2. Therefore, if the firm’s management has delayed the
investment decision in period 1 it will undertake project A in period 2
if the realization of V2A exceeds zero and otherwise abstain from invest-
ing. We assume that <.6 To decide whether the firm should invest in
period 1 it calculates the expected value of the option to invest in the
second period:
4 It is useful to note that we do not model the cost of investing explicitly in our model.
5Without losing generality we abstract from discounting.
6 This assumption implies that the probability that the firm does not implement project
A in the second period is strictly positive, because in the worst case scenario
V2A ¼   < 0.
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FðVAÞ ¼
Zþ
0
1
2
V2AdV
2
A ¼
þ ð Þ2
4
¼ E > 0: ð1Þ
It is optimal to invest in period 1 if V1A > F(VA). Otherwise the firm will
postpone the investment decision until period 2. In line with the real
options literature our model indicates that the net present value rule is
incorrect (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In fact Equation (1) shows that the
net present value of the investment in period 1, V1A, should be strictly
larger than zero to be willing to invest in period 1. Furthermore it is
straightforward that the higher the uncertainty as measured by , the
higher the value of delaying the investment: @E/@> 0. This result
indicates that higher uncertainty tends to depress investment. Various
studies provide empirical support for this claim (Guiso and Parigi, 1999;
Ghosal and Loungani, 2000). Finally, delaying the investment becomes
more likely as the expected value of V2A increases: @E/@> 0.
III. TWO INVESTMENT PROJECTS
The objective of the paper is to provide insights concerning the role of
limited availability of funds in determining investment in light of the real
options approach. Due to capital market imperfections, firms may find
that a shortage of cash constrains investment if the terms at which bank
loans can be obtained are unfavourable. This lack of financial means will
affect their investment decision.7
Suppose that in addition to project A the firm has an alternative
investment option called project B. If the firm chooses to invest in
project B in period 1 this yields V1B. To simplify our analysis, the net
present value of project B in the second period is also uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [, þ]. V2A and V2B are independent. These
assumptions affect the generality of our results, but the main argument
that the firm has an incentive to learn which project is most profitable
holds in this more general setting as well.
Implicitly we assume that the returns of a project implemented in
period 1 are insufficient to provide the required funds to start another
project in period 2. The best way of thinking about this aspect of the
model is that each project’s cash flow is spread over many periods. To
7Firms may face difficulties in acquiring external financial resources like bank loans or
equity because of an information asymmetry between the firm’s management and the
bank concerning the profitability of investment opportunities. Alternatively the principals
(i.e., holders of claims on the firm) cannot perfectly monitor the activities of their agent
(i.e., the management team of the firm). See Hubbard (1998) for an excellent review of
this literature.
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simplify our analysis further, we assume the financial resources of the
firm may be used to start an investment project, but the firm is not able
to acquire any additional external funds to finance investment. If finan-
cial constraints are not binding the firm may choose to invest in both
project A and B. The firm should apply the methodology depicted in
Section II to both projects separately, since the value of the firm is
additive in the values of the two projects. This means that the firm will
invest in project A (B, respectively) in the first period if and only if
V1A  F(VA), and consider its investment in the second period otherwise.
The firm does not have to choose between the two projects, but can
evaluate them separately.
However, if the firm faces limited availability of funds it has the
option of undertaking one project at most. The financial constraint
implies that by investing in project A the firm gives up the option to
invest in project B. The decision of whether to invest in the first period
depends on the expected value of the two investment projects A and B in
the second period. Therefore we start solving the firm’s decision in the
second period:
invests in A if V2A  V2B and V2A  0;
invests in B if V2B > V
2
A and V
2
B  0;
does not invest if V2A < 0 and V
2
B < 0:
ð2Þ
An important feature of our model is that a number of projects are
engaged in a race for a limited amount of funds. The limitation is such
that only one project can be chosen. In fact we determine the value of the
maximum of two random assets. Our approach resembles closely the set-
up of Stulz (1982) and Johnson (1987) who derive the price of options on
the maximum (and minimum) of several assets. Their approach is more
general in the sense that they assume the price of the underlying assets
follow a Geometric Brownian Motion, and the expected value and the
variance of the rate of return may be different for each asset. Further-
more, the returns of the various assets may be correlated. In contrast we
assume that the returns to the projects are identically (i.e., returns of the
projects have the same expected value and variance) and independently
(and uniformly) distributed. In short, we apply a different assumption
regarding the distribution of returns, and take a rather simple structure
of the stochastic processes. Though we lose some degree of generality,
we gain tractability of the model which allows us to derive some straight-
forward comparative static results even in the case of N projects, in a
way that provides insight and consistency.
We assume that the firm cannot sell the investment option that it did
not implement to another firm, because the option results from firm-
specific resources or capabilities that cannot be imitated or transferred to
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other companies (see Barney, 1991). Therefore in the first period the
expected value of the two investment projects is given by (see the
Appendix):
FðVA;VBÞ ¼
Zþ
0
ZVA

VA
42
dVBdVAþ
Zþ
0
ZVB

VB
42
dVAdVB
¼
1
3
ðþ Þ2  1
2
ðþ Þ2ð Þ
22
:
ð3Þ
Since we assume that > it can be shown after some straightforward
calculations that
FðVA;VBÞ ¼ E 1 2
3
 1
3


 
> 1
1
3
E ð4Þ
where E is defined in Equation (1). Equation (4) indicates that the presence
of two investment opportunities in combination with limited availability of
funds raises the critical benchmark at which the firm finds it optimal to
invest in the first period bymore than 33 percent. This is due to the fact that
by investing in either A or B the firm gives up the opportunity to invest in
the other project later, which may be undesirable because the unfunded
project may yield a favourable outcome in the future.
The results above suggest that the timing of investment by financially
constrained and unconstrained firms will differ. Suppose that a popula-
tion of firms exists in which each firm considers the same investment
projects, A and B. Firms that do not face a shortage of cash are more
likely to start project A or B in the first period than financially con-
strained firms, because the critical value E at which these firms are
willing to invest is lower than that of the constrained firms.
It can be shown that if the expected value of the future returns of the
two projects, i.e., , increases that:
@FðVA;VBÞ
@
¼ þ 
2
3
2
 1
2


 
>
þ 
2
> 0: ð5Þ
This result implies that the firm’s incentive to delay the investment
decision increases with a higher expected future return . The same
holds if the parameter  measuring the amount of uncertainty surround-
ing the projects increases:
@FðVA;VBÞ
@
¼ @E
@
1
2
3
 1
3


 
þ 1
3
E

2
>
@E
@
1
1
3
 
þ 1
3
E

2
> 0: ð6Þ
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Therefore, higher uncertainty tends to increase the incentive to postpone
investing.8
IV. N INVESTMENT PROJECTS
The above findings readily extend to the case where the financially
constrained firm has the opportunity to choose one project out of N
possibilities. As in the previous section, we assume that the future
returns of project i denoted by V2i are identically and independently
distributed on the interval [, þ]. In the second period the firm:
invests in project i if V2i  V2j and V2i  0; for i 6¼ j; i; j 2 1; . . . ;Nf g
does not invest if V2i < 0 for all i; i 2 1; . . . ;Nf g: ð7Þ
Using partial integration we show in the Appendix that in the first
period the expected value of these N projects equals:
FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
Zþ
0
ZVi

   
ZVi

Vi
2NN
dVi
Y
i 6¼j
dVj
¼ ðþ Þ  2
N þ 1þ
ð ÞNþ1
ðN þ 1Þð2ÞN
ð8Þ
After some straightforward but tedious calculations performed in the
Appendix we find for N¼ 2 that the expression in Equation (8) is
equivalent to the one presented in Equation (3).
In the Appendix it is shown that if the number of projects increases by
one the change in the expected value of the projects equals:
FðV1; . . . ;VNþ1ÞFðV1; . . . ;VNÞ
¼ 1
N þ 1ð Þ N þ 2ð Þ 2
 
2
 Nþ1
ððN þ 3Þþ ðN þ 1ÞÞ
 
:
ð9Þ
Our assumptions made previously imply that 0 < 1  < 1. Further-
more, by using mathematical induction it is verified in the appendix
that for all N 1 it holds that 0 < Nþ3
2Nþ1  1 and 0 < Nþ12Nþ1  1. This implies
that the change in the expected value of the projects is positive when the
number of projects increases.
8 This finding corresponds with the results of Stulz (1982). If one assumes in his model
that the exercise price is equal to zero, the returns to the assets are independently
distributed, then higher uncertainty increases the value of the option and hence the
option to wait. This follows from his Equations (19) and (12).
THE DELAYING EFFECT OF FINANCING CONSTRAINTS 277
# Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research 2004.
FðV1; . . . ;VNþ1Þ  FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ > 1ðN þ 1ÞðN þ 2Þ ð2 ðþ ÞÞ > 0:
ð10Þ
Therefore, the critical value at which the firm is willing to invest
increases with the number of projects. Loosely interpreted, financing
constraints become tighter as N increases since the firm can only select
one project.9 Therefore, the above result in Equation (10) indicates that
tighter financing constraints increase the value of waiting.
If the number of projects increases to infinity the expected value of the
projects becomes:
lim
N!1
FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ ¼ þ : ð11Þ
The result follows from the fact that all random variables V2i are
identically and independently distributed on the interval [, þ].
If the number of projects increases to infinity then with probability one
in the second period, the value of one of these projects will be þ, the
maximum realization possible.
We also find that the value of the investment projects increases with
the expected future benefits of the projects:
@FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ
@
¼ 1 1ðN þ 1Þ2
1
2N
1 

 N
: ð12Þ
Since the three terms after the minus sign in the above equation are all
larger than zero but smaller than 1, the sign of the derivative is positive,
implying that the firm is willing to wait longer if the future prospects of
the projects improve. Finally, as we show in the Appendix, higher
uncertainty increases the value of the investment projects in the future
as well:
@FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ
@
¼ 1 2
N þ 1þ
ð ÞN
ðN þ 1Þ2N
þN
Nþ1
 
> 0: ð13Þ
Hence, as uncertainty increases it becomes more likely that the firm will
wait before investing to see which of the N projects is the most fruitful
one.
9 In fact, the financial constraint does not necessarily become tighter, but the number of
alternative projects increases. Thus, the threshold of adoption of a given project increases,
as the number of projects increases. This holds true because the probability that a
competing project has a more favourable return increases with an increased number of
projects.
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V. CONCLUSION
We have studied a model in which a firm has a number of potential
investment projects. Due to financial constraints it can select only one of
these projects. The firm decides to implement one of these projects as the
immediate return of this particular project exceeds a certain critical
value. This critical value increases if the number of potential projects
becomes larger and if uncertainty increases. The reason is that there
exists an option value to waiting, because the decision to choose a
particular project cannot be reversed. Therefore, waiting allows the
firm to learn which project is the best one if future profitability is
uncertain. The results of the model hold under the following assump-
tions. First, the firm can delay its investment decision for one period.
Second, the risk characteristics of all projects are identical. Third, the
returns to the projects are independently distributed.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of Equation (3)
Since the two terms in
R þ
0
RVA

VA
42
dVBdVAþ
R þ
0
RVB

VB
42
dVAdVB
are equal, we find that FðVA;VBÞ ¼ 2
R þ
0
RVA

VA
42
dVBdVA ¼ 122
R þ
0
VA VA  þ ð ÞdVA.
It is straightforward to show that the above integral is equal to the
expression in (3).
Derivation of Equation (8)
Since the N terms of
PN
i¼1
R þ
0
RVi
    
RVi

Vi
2NN
Q
j 6¼i
dVj
 !
dVi are equal,
FðV1; . . . ;VNÞ ¼ N2ð ÞN
R þ
0 Vi Vi  þ ð ÞN1dVi ¼
N
2ð ÞN
þð Þ 2ð ÞN
N
 R þ0 Viþð ÞNN dVi  ¼ þ ð Þ  N2ð ÞN 2ð ÞNþ1Nþ1ð ÞN  ð ÞNþ1Nþ1ð ÞN
 
.
This is equal to the expression in Equation (8).
Derivation that for N¼ 2 Equation (8) equals Equation (3).
Starting with Equation (8),
F(V1;V2)¼ 1
22
22þ234
3
3þ1
6
þ2ð Þ3
 
¼ 1
22
22þ2
3
3þ1
6
þð Þ36 þð Þ2þ122 þð Þ83
  
¼ 1
22
1
3
þð Þ3þ22þ2
3
3þ1
6
 þð Þ36 þð Þ2þ122 þð Þ83
  
¼ 1
22
1
3
þð Þ31
2
3þ223  : Equation ð3Þ follows immediately:
Derivation of Equation (9)
F V1; . . . ;VNþ1ð Þ  F V1; . . . ;VNð Þ
¼ 1
Nþ1 1Nþ2
 
2þ 
2
 Nþ1 
Nþ2 2Nþ1
 
¼ 2
Nþ1ð Þ Nþ2ð Þ þ 2
 Nþ1 Nþ1ð Þ ð Þ2 Nþ2ð Þ
Nþ1ð Þ Nþ2ð Þ
 
. This can be used to derive
Equation (9).
Derivation of Equation (10)
We need to show that for all N> 1, 0 < AN ¼ Nþ32Nþ1  1 and
0 < BN ¼ Nþ12Nþ1  1. It is sufficient to show that 0<AN 1 since
AN>BN. AN> 0 is obvious. For N¼ 1, AN¼ 1. Suppose that our claim
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holds for N. ANþ1 ¼ Nþ3þ12Nþ2 ¼ AN2 þ 12Nþ2  12þ 12Nþ2  1. Our assumptions
made previously imply 0 < 1  < 1. Equation (10) follows straightfor-
wardly. QED.
Derivation of Equation (13)
@F V1;...;VNð Þ
@ ¼ 1 2Nþ1þ 1Nþ1ð Þ2N Nþ1ð Þ ð Þ
NN ð ÞNþ1NN1
2N
 
¼ 1 2
Nþ1þ ð Þ
N
Nþ1ð Þ2N
Nþ1ð Þ ð ÞN
Nþ1
 
. Equation (13) can be obtained by
collecting terms. @F V1;...;VNð Þ@ is positive, since 1 2Nþ1 is positive for N> 1
and Nþ1ð Þ ð ÞN
Nþ1
 
> 0.
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